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PREVENTING DRUNK FLYING:
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
JOHN SIVILS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL LAW is that“citizens must be given fair warning that certain conduct
might subject them to criminal sanction.”1 Despite espousing
this principle, courts have taken seemingly clear statutes that
criminalize drunk driving and broadened them to the point that
one need not be driving—or even in possession of a functioning
car—to be convicted of drunk driving.2 An intoxicated driver
might have enough awareness to pull over and sleep off her
buzz instead of putting lives in danger, but that same driver
could face the same penalty as if she had been pulled over for
swerving between lanes.3
Likewise, criminal flying statutes have been interpreted
broadly and counterintuitively, to the point that pilots have
been punished for illegally “operating” an airplane when merely
performing a preflight inspection,4 taxiing the airplane,5 or fill-
ing the airplane with fuel an entire day before a planned flight.6
One unfortunate pilot was found to have been “operating” an
* John Sivils is a J.D. Candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law graduating in
May 2020. John earned a Bachelor of Arts in English from Ouachita Baptist
University in Arkadelphia, Arkansas. John would like to thank his wife, Mary, and
the men of F3 Dallas for constantly pushing him to pursue every opportunity with
hard work and dedication.
1 United States v. Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2018).
2 See infra Section III.
3 See infra note 38 (citing cases where the defendant was found guilty of drunk
driving after being found asleep in a running car).
4 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 441.
5 Collins, 2 N.T.S.B. 1494, 1495–96 (1975).
6 United States v. St. Amour, 886 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 205 (2018).
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airplane when the airplane he attempted—and failed—to start
was under maintenance and therefore unable to move.7
These broad interpretations of “operate” reflect a trend to-
ward judicial imposition of heightened control over non-flight
activities surrounding flight. Although there is relatively little
caselaw offering broad definitions of “operating” an airplane,
there is much scholarly concern and debate surrounding federal
preemption of state claims arising from in-flight incidents and
non-flight activities. The broadening of the statutory language
regulating flights to encompass non-flight activity mirrors the
trend of asserting preemption to subject airlines to more regula-
tions and avoiding preemption when it would allow airlines to
dodge state tort claims. More precisely, the judicial strategy of
broadly interpreting statutes to effectuate policy goals can be
better understood as another method of tightening control over
aviation, as courts have done by finding federal preemption in
some areas of the law and avoiding preemption in others.
Aside from the fact that these broad interpretations of “oper-
ating” seem to run afoul of the notice principle,8 they also lead
to increased criminal punishment of non-flight pilot conduct.
There are certainly safety concerns that would lead courts and
legislatures to want to discourage dangerous conduct through
criminal punishment; however, despite the seemingly logical ar-
gument that increased penalties will lead to decreased crime,
one must wonder whether the benefits generated from in-
creased penalization, if any, outweigh the costs associated with
criminal punishment.9 In other words, does judicial tightening
of penal control over non-flight activities through preemption
and flexible statutory interpretation succeed in effecting legisla-
tive public safety goals? And if so, is this approach the best
method, especially in light of technology that can detect pilot
intoxication without the need of any visible signs?
Congress can easily make the number of drunk flying convic-
tions drop to zero by requiring airlines to test a pilot’s blood-
alcohol levels when she arrives for her shift. Pilots with danger-
ous blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) levels could then be
sent home instead of being arrested and prosecuted, giving
them no opportunity to endanger airplane passengers while also
avoiding the costs of criminal punishment. There is a strong ar-
7 Dailey, 3 N.T.S.B. 1319, 1321–22 (1978).
8 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Section IV (for a discussion of the costs of criminal punishment).
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gument that overdisciplining pilots by punishing them before
they actually put anyone in danger—referred in this Comment
as the penal approach—is not as effective or as beneficial to the
general public as preventing the crime from happening at all—
referred to in this Comment as the impossibility approach. Com-
ing to this conclusion requires: an examination of the judicial
rationale for broadening criminal statutes to effectuate the pe-
nal approach (Section II); a comparison with similar judicial
broadening of statutory language in the context of drunk-driv-
ing statutes (Section III); a consideration of the cost of a crime
(Section IV); and an overview of the flight process and current
regulation of pilots’ preflight conduct (Section V). These issues
are synthesized in the conclusion that a better method of effec-
tuating the policy goal of air safety is for the federal government
to mandate BAC testing of pilots before preflight checks.
II. THE PENAL APPROACH: WHY “OPERATING”
DOESN’T ALWAYS MEAN “DRIVING”
On the morning that he was scheduled to fly from Michigan
to Massachusetts, airplane pilot Sean Fitzgerald came to work
late and “rip-roaring drunk.”10 Fitzgerald’s eyes were bloodshot
and his breath reeked of alcohol.11 Thankfully, Fitzgerald was
arrested before he ever set the airplane in motion. However,
before law enforcement arrived, Fitzgerald “ordered fuel; com-
pleted a ‘walkaround’ inspection of the outside of the airplane;
and entered the cockpit, where he calibrated the altimeter,
programmed the flight-management system, turned on the aux-
iliary power unit, and requested flight clearance from air-traffic
control.”12 Fitzgerald never turned on the airplane’s engines,13
nor did any passengers board the airplane.14
Fitzgerald’s behavior led to his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 342 for operating an aircraft while intoxicated.15 Fitzgerald ap-
pealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that operating a common car-
rier under this statute should at least require movement of the
airplane.16 Thus, he argued that the broad and flexible defini-
10 United States v. Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2018).
11 Id. at 441.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 442.
14 Id. at 440.
15 Id. at 441; see also 18 U.S.C. § 342 (2012).
16 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 442.
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tion adopted by the trial court led to an erroneous jury instruc-
tion and, consequently, an erroneous conviction.17 The Sixth
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that a stricter definition
requiring passengers aboard, engines on, and movement is
“neither textually mandated nor practically sensible.”18 Thus, in
the face of criticism from dissenting Justice Griffin, the court
upheld Fitzgerald’s conviction.19
Recognizing that a word not defined in the statute should be
given its “ordinary or natural meaning,” the majority began its
de novo review with an examination of the plain meaning of
“operate” in the context of the statute.20 The court noted that if
a text allows for multiple interpretations of a particular word,
the court must choose the definition that serves, rather than
frustrates, the legislative purpose.21 The majority found that any
of the dictionary definitions for “operate” are sufficiently broad
to encompass Fitzgerald’s preflight activities,22 but it chose to
define “operate” as “to run or control” something.23 Even
though Fitzgerald’s actions in isolation were not sufficient to
cause the airplane to take flight, they were necessary steps along
the way.24 Under this logic, “operating” encompassed Fitzger-
ald’s preflight activities.
Realizing that such a broad definition needed some limitation
so as not to subject every person who comes into contact with a
machine to criminal liability,25 the majority added the require-
ment that “operate” must be interpreted in a way that “accounts
for common carriers’ essential movement function.”26 Since
“the safe and effective movement of an airplane is not deter-
mined by actions taken only after passengers board or the en-
gines start or the airplane moves,” the majority reasoned that
Fitzgerald’s preflight actions could be within the scope of “oper-
ate.”27 The fact that Fitzgerald’s preflight actions “may actually
17 Id.
18 Id. at 448.
19 Id. at 451.
20 Id. at 442–43.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 443.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 443–44.
25 Id. at 443.
26 Id. at 444.
27 Id.
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directly control the function of the aircraft” added further justi-
fication for this definition.28
Finally, the majority considered the safety-related purpose of
§ 342 to find that definition of “operate” requiring passengers
and motion would defeat the purpose of “protect[ing] passen-
gers on common carriers during movement.”29 A narrower read-
ing of operate would lead to the absurd result that “the drunk
pilot would have to be traveling down the runway, with human
lives strapped into a twenty-ton hunk of metal and fuel, hurtling
toward 35,000 feet at 500 miles per hour, before federal law
would prohibit his conduct.”30 Such an interpretation would
“defang” this law’s ability to effectuate its public safety
purpose.31
This broad and flexible understanding of the term “operate”
is not unique to this case or this statute. As noted by the Elev-
enth Circuit in a similar case interpreting “operating an aircraft”
in the context of 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(9), a long line of admin-
istrative decisions have consistently held that the term “operat-
ing” includes any activity “preparatory or incident to the flight
of [an] aircraft.”32 Although Fitzgerald and St. Amour involve dif-
ferent statutes, the definition of “operate” adopted by both cir-
cuits is similarly broad and flexible.33 In fact, there is likely no
functional difference in application of the definitions. This
broad, malleable language gives courts and administrative agen-
28 Id. at 445.
29 Id. at 446–47.
30 Id. at 447.
31 Id. at 447–48.
32 United States v. St. Amour, 886 F.3d 1009, 1014 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing
Hise, 38 C.A.B. 1237, 1237 (1963) (holding that a person was operating an air-
craft when he taxied to a tie-down area and stopped the aircraft but kept the
engine running); Ruhland, 26 C.A.B. 799, 799 (1957) (holding that a person was
not operating an aircraft by accidentally starting the engine in a maintenance
hangar because he did not have intent to fly); Dailey, 3 N.T.S.B. 1319, 1319–20
(1978) (holding that a person was operating an aircraft by attempting to start the
engine even though the aircraft was under maintenance and could not move)
(affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Daily v. Bond, 623 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Collins, 2 N.T.S.B. 1494, 1495–96 (1975) (holding that a person
was operating an aircraft by taxiing the aircraft); Pauly, 2 N.T.S.B. 1369, 1369–71
(1975) (holding that a person was operating an aircraft by attempting to start the
aircraft with jumper cables attached to a car)).
33 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 445 (defining “operates” to include pilot actions “di-
rectly and proximately linked to actual operational or functional requirements
for the flight”); St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1014 (defining “operating” to encompass
“any use of an aircraft for the purpose of air navigation, including flight itself and
actions that are preparatory or incident to flight”).
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cies ample power to punish any activity, whether during flight or
preflight, that could affect the flight itself.34
Both circuits gave great weight to the perceived policy goal of
flight safety in justifying their adoption of broad definitions.35
Although the Eleventh Circuit does not explicitly say as much,
its definition of “operating” reflects the Sixth Circuit’s finding
that “preflight actions might well dictate the airplane’s move-
ment once the engines are fired up and the plane is in the
air.”36 These definitions, although pragmatic, are arguably less
logical than the interpretation offered by dissenting Justice Grif-
fin in Fitzgerald that preparatory actions only constitute an un-
punishable attempt to operate, since the legislature has
included other attempt crimes in its aviation legislation yet
failed to do so in the statute at issue.37 Although Fitzgerald and St.
Amour deal with different statutes, they share similar language
and both lack an attempt provision.
III. COMPARISON TO DRUNK DRIVING
A. AN INTERPRETIVE MESS: DRIVING, OPERATING,
AND ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
Judicial broadening of terms such as “operating” is not
unique to aviation statutes. In fact, in the context of drunk-driv-
ing statutes, courts across the United States have struggled to
define just what kind of activity constitutes “operating” or “driv-
ing” a motor vehicle. For example, some courts have held that a
defendant can be liable for “operating” a vehicle while intoxi-
cated when the defendant is asleep inside a running car.38 Some
34 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 445 (“actions [can] only count as operating if they
[are] connected to ‘the flight’ of the airplane.”); St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1015
(“[t]he definitions do not speak in terms of time; they speak only of purpose.”).
35 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 448 (finding that a broad definition of “operating” is
superior to a restrictive definition because it “would further § 342’s public-safety
purpose, not frustrate it.”); St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1014 (finding that a broad
definition of “operates” promotes the aims of federal aviation legislation, includ-
ing “assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest pri-
orities in air commerce”) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40404(d)(1) (2012)).
36 See Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 445.
37 Id. at 453 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
38 Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d 935, 938 (Alaska 1976); State v. Wiggs, 760 A.2d
148, 150 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Johnson, 353 N.E.2d 130, 131 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976); Custer v. State, 637 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Kendall, 58 P.3d 660, 666 (Kan. 2002); State v. Hudson, 617 So. 2d 83, 85–86 (La.
Ct. App. 1993); People v. Wood, 538 N.W.2d 351, 353–54 (Mich. 1995); Cox v.
Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550–51 (Mo. 2003); State v. Hudson, 114 P.3d
210, 213 (Mont. 2005); People v. Totman, 617 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (N.Y. App. Div.
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do not even require the engine to be running.39 Conversely,
some courts, even courts in states that adopt broad definitions
of “operate” for purposes of interpreting drunk-driving statutes,
have declined to find “operation” when the defendant was
found in the driver’s seat of a parked and running car.40 To fur-
ther complicate the issue, the South Dakota Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Nekolite arguably “grants a license to operate a
vehicle while drunk, so long as the person is not in the driver’s
seat and claims the control was impulsive or involuntary,” while
at the same time, it “endorses convicting the intoxicated person
who elects to ‘sleep off’ the buzz in the front seat, even when the
vehicle has not moved . . . .”41 Thus, jurisdictions that refuse to
adopt a bright-line rule (e.g., vehicle motion) for defining “op-
erate” in drunk-driving statutes leave much room for varied,
fact-specific, and sometimes conflicting holdings. The only
clear, and somewhat counterintuitive, principle that can be
gleaned from these cases is that being drunk while close to a
vehicle could subject a defendant to liability for drunk driving,
even if that defendant is not, as most would understand it, driv-
ing a vehicle. In fact, the car need not even be turned on for a
conviction to lie.
Although all of the above inconsistencies relate to statutes
that use “operate,” some legislatures employ terms such as “driv-
ing” or “being in actual physical control” for drunk- driving stat-
utes.42 The difference in diction is salient, as “it is generally held
that the word ‘drive,’ as used in statutes of this kind, usually de-
notes movement of the vehicle in some direction.”43 However,
courts tend to hold that the terms “operating” or “being in ac-
tual physical control” give the statutes a “broad scope not lim-
1994); Garza v. State, 846 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
writ ref’d).
39 State v. Conley, 754 P.2d 232, 236 (Alaska 1988); Sengchanthong v. Comm’r
of Motor Vehicles, 917 A.2d 942, 946 (Conn. 2007); State v. Rossignol, 654 A.2d
1297, 1299 (Me. 1995); Nelson v. Fischer, 190 S.W.3d 404, 407–08 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006); State v. Gill, 637 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ohio 1994); State v. Kingsfield, 630
N.W.2d 276, 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
40 State v. Haight, 869 A.2d 251, 254–56 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Clark v. State,
611 N.E.2d 181, 181–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Wells v. Commonwealth, 709
S.W.2d 847, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Plowman, 548 N.E.2d
1278, 1280–81 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
41 Kimberly B. McNulty, Comment, “No Hands”: Reevaluating What Control Is
Necessary to Establish Actual Physical Control Following State v. Nekolite, 61 S.D. L.
REV. 280, 309 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
42 Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 412 (Cal. 1991).
43 Id. at 411 (quoting State v. Graves, 237 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 1977)).
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ited to or dependent on volitional movement of a vehicle.”44
Thus, it is not uncommon for a court to construe an “operating”
statute as encompassing not only driving but also “acts which
engage the machinery of the vehicle that, alone or in sequence,
will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.”45
Despite these variations in word usage, some courts still de-
fine “driving” expansively. For example, a California court held
that a defendant was “driving” a moped even when the defen-
dant was merely pedaling the moped without the motor on.46
Other courts have held that a defendant was “driving” a car even
when it was inoperable,47 and that a defendant was “driving” a
car when it was stuck in the mud.48 A court in Washington found
a defendant guilty of drunk “driving” even when his car was out
of gas.49 While one might conclude that courts support convic-
tions under these situations based on the assumption that de-
fendants were driving at one point, even though they were not
actually driving at the time of being caught, many courts still
uphold these convictions “even when it is not apparent the
driver had recently been driving.”50
B. POLICY CONCERNS FOR BROAD INTERPRETATIONS
OF DRUNK-DRIVING STATUTES
In addition to the obvious lack of clarity in the definitions of
what activity constitutes “operating” a vehicle, the expansion of
criminal liability to non-driving activity suffers from other flaws.
One such flaw is that criminalizing non-driving activity under
drunk-driving statutes does not encourage drunk drivers to park
their cars and sober up, as would a statute narrower in scope.51
It logically follows that a drunk driver—faced with the decision
of either pulling over and waiting to sober up or taking the risk
of driving the rest of the way home—may be more inclined to
44 Id. at 412.
45 Id. at 411 (quoting Graves, 237 S.E.2d at 586).
46 People v. Jordan, 142 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1977).
47 People v. David W., 442 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
48 State v. Dubany, 167 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Neb. 1969).
49 State v. Smelter, 674 P.2d 690, 693–94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
50 State v. Conley, 754 P.2d 232, 235 (Alaska 1988); see also City of Cincinnati v.
Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85, 85–88 (Ohio 1976) (where defendant’s conviction for driv-
ing drunk was upheld when he drove downtown sober, parked his car, began
drinking, realized he was in no condition to drive, went to his car, called his wife
to pick him up, and then slept in his car as he waited for her to arrive).
51 See Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 414 (Cal. 1991).
2019] PREVENTING DRUNK FLYING 613
try to get home to avoid being arrested for being drunk in a
parked car.52
Another flaw is that allowing convictions for drunk driving to
lie from non-driving activities unduly prioritizes a state’s interest
in detecting and preventing drunk driving at the expense of
punishing not only those who have committed a crime, but
those who might commit a crime.53 The effect is a judicially cre-
ated attempt crime that the legislature did not intend to pun-
ish.54 After all, “[t]he limitations of a text—what a text chooses
not to do—are as much a part of its ‘purpose’ as its affirmative
dispositions.”55 Even if punishing attempted drunk driving
would be in line with the legislature’s policy goal of ensuring
road safety, “purpose cannot be used to supplement a statute’s
text.”56
There may also be legitimate concerns with judicially ex-
panding these statutes to become overinclusive. Some argue
that it is better for a statute to be underinclusive, allowing some
who engage in unreasonable behavior to avoid suffering punish-
ment, than to be overinclusive to the point that people are pun-
ished for engaging in reasonable behavior.57 This argument
relies on the sentiment that “[i]t is better to free ten guilty de-
fendants than to punish one innocent defendant.”58 There is
also the principle of fair notice—“the idea that citizens must be
given fair warning that certain conduct might subject them to
criminal sanction”—that should give pause to judges who wish
to stray too far from a clear, commonly understood definition.59
While courts purport merely to be attempting to effect the
legislature’s intent by broadly interpreting drunk-driving stat-
utes that use words such as “operating,”60 they may in fact be
52 See id.
53 See United States v. Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2018) (Griffin, J.,
dissenting).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 454 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 57
(2012)).
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legisla-
tion, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 604 (1998).
58 Id.
59 Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d at 448 (majority opinion).
60 E.g., State v. Conley, 754 P.2d 232, 236 (Alaska 1988) (“the general purpose
of our drunk driving laws is to deter persons from driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs.”); City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Ohio
1976) (“The clear purpose of . . . the instant ordinance is to deter persons from
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following the historical trend of ratcheting up punishment for
drunk driving.61 Despite alarming rates of fatal car accidents,
early enforcement of drunk-driving laws was “lax” and “inconsis-
tent.”62 This lax enforcement may have been due to ignorance
of the prevalence of drunk driving.63 Moreover, lack of a
method for testing BAC made it hard for law enforcement to
prove intoxication.64 There is also evidence that law enforce-
ment did not consider drunk driving a “real” crime,65 perhaps
due, at least in part, to the prevailing idea that alcoholism was
“more of a disease than a crime.”66
Beginning with the federal push to raise the legal drinking
age in all states to twenty-one,67 social pressure led to increased
attempts to apprehend drunk drivers through enforcement ef-
forts such as sobriety checkpoints.68 Data show that these were
not very effective at actually increasing drunk-driving arrests,69
but they were very effective in generating a lot of media atten-
tion.70 This increased intrusion into driver behavior mirrored
the similarly intrusive laws that were passed to ratchet up pun-
ishment for drinking, even drinking that bore no relationship to
driving.71 It is no surprise, then, that drinking and driving be-
came a “hot crime” garnering excessive punishment, media at-
tention, and public vitriol.72
Courts clearly consider the severity of drunk driving when is-
suing opinions.73 Additionally, judicial vitriol toward drunk driv-
being found under circumstances in which they can directly commence operat-
ing a vehicle while they are under the influence of alcohol or particular drugs.”).
61 See Steven Grossman, Hot Crimes: A Study in Excess, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 33,
33–34 (2011) (“There came a point, however, when reaction turned into over-
reaction and remedial measures became excessive.”).
62 Id. at 36.
63 Id. (“[R]esearch into drunk driving did not begin in earnest until after the
drunk driving problem was ‘federalized.’”).
64 Id. at 37.
65 Id. at 36 (“For example, until the 1990s, the FBI did not even include drunk
driving related crimes in the national crime database.”).
66 Id. at 37.
67 Id. at 40.
68 Id. at 43–44.
69 Id. at 44–46.
70 Id. at 49–50 (“In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens,
‘[S]obriety checkpoints are elaborate, and disquieting, publicity stunts.’”).
71 See id. at 56–57.
72 Id. at 42.
73 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 274 P.2d 338, 339–40 (Ariz. 1954) (“It appears to us
to be even more important for the legislature to prevent operators of cars who
are under the influence of intoxicating liquors or who are at the time driving
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ing and its potential for danger to the public pervades judicial
opinions.74 Recognition of drunk driving’s dangers is war-
ranted,75 but the excessive focus put on drunk driving, driven
primarily by interest groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD), has clearly led to a harsher view of drunk driv-
ing than crimes of equal or greater danger.76 Thus, a person
accused of drunk driving will bear the stigma of a heinous
crime. This stigma that accompanies a conviction for a hot
crime such as drunk driving carries with it many collateral con-
sequences that impact far more people than just the accused.
IV. THE COST OF A CRIME
Despite the seemingly intuitive argument that increased pun-
ishment will generally have positive effects (e.g., reduced
crime),77 researchers warn that conviction and imprisonment
bear many collateral consequences on not only the imprisoned
but also the families of the imprisoned and the rest of society.78
recklessly and in wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or prop-
erty, from entering upon the highways and into the stream of traffic than to per-
mit them to enter thereon and after a tragic accident has happened to punish
them for maiming or causing the death of those who are lawfully in the use of
such highways.”) (quoting State v. Harold, 246 P.2d 178, 181 (Ariz. 1952)).
74 See, e.g., id. at 340 (“An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel
of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public.”); Ebona v.
State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978) (“The significant dangers to persons or
property that can possibly result when the operator’s capacity to control a motor
vehicle is impaired are apparent. A vehicle out of control, even on a relatively
deserted street, poses a significant threat to property or individuals in proximity
to the vehicle.”).
75 See Kelsey P. Black, Note, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examin-
ing the Drinking and Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
463, 463–64 (2007) (“Drunk driving is the nation’s most commonly perpetrated
violent crime. Officials approximate that a drunk driver kills two people every
hour. In 2003, police arrested one out of every 135 drivers for driving under the
influence. In 2004, drunk drivers caused the deaths of thirty-nine percent of indi-
viduals involved in fatal motor vehicle accidents.”) (footnotes omitted).
76 See Grossman, supra note 61, at 57–58. Grossman notes that MADD inter-
vened in the release of low-level, nonviolent offenders from prison to have drunk
drivers reclassified as violent offenders, while burglars and drug criminals were
set free. Id. at 57. Grossman also points out that people who use cell phones while
driving are not punished nearly as severely as drunk drivers, despite data showing
that distracted driving is more dangerous than driving with a .08 BAC. Id. at 58.
77 See John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for
Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 121 (1999).
78 See, e.g., id. at 122 (“The most obvious concern is that the effects of imprison-
ment damage the human and social capital of those who are incarcerated, their
families, and their communities, including the detrimental impact of imprison-
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For example, people with a criminal record face diminished em-
ployment prospects.79 If the imprisoned person was contribut-
ing to the support of his or her family, then that incarceration
causes financial strain on the other members of the family.80 If
the imprisoned was a parent, his or her imprisonment leaves the
remaining parent with less money and time to invest in their
children.81 Financial strain on a family could continue even af-
ter release from prison due to the difficulties a convicted crimi-
nal faces in finding meaningful employment and in receiving
government assistance.82 The community of the imprisoned suf-
fers from the loss of a productive worker who can contribute
positively to the economy,83 while also having to collectively bear
the cost of a higher prison population.84
Even general societal stigma, which ordinarily follows criminal
conviction,85 can have extreme consequences. In this context,
stigma is defined as “someone’s reluctance to interact with
someone else who has a criminal record.”86 One explanation for
this reluctance is that most people find crime morally repugnant
and thus choose to avoid criminals.87 An equally probable expla-
ing parents on their children.”); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Crimi-
nal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 490
(2010) (citing the following as some of the most prominent collateral conse-
quences of imprisonment in the United States: “exclusion from public or govern-
ment-assisted housing, employment-related legal barriers, ineligibility for public
benefits, and felon disenfranchisement.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and
Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1271, 1281 (2004) (“Community harms affect more than the total number of
residents who have been incarcerated. Indeed . . . community members other
than inmates, including family members, friends, and neighbors of prisoners . . .
suffer adverse consequences that flow beyond the prison gates.”).
79 Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 77, at 122.
80 Id. at 124.
81 Id.
82 Pinard, supra note 78, at 492–94.
83 See Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 77, at 134.
84 See id. at 130 (noting that prison investment “is so extensive that several large
states now spend as much or more money to incarcerate young adults than to
educate their college-age citizens. From the 1980s through the late 1990s, correc-
tions spending has grown at a faster rate than any other state spending category,
with state corrections budgets almost tripling, increasing from $7 billion in 1986
to more than $20 billion in 1996.”) (citations omitted).
85 Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of
Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355–56 (2007); see
also Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 519, 520 (1996).
86 Rasmusen, supra note 85, at 520.
87 Id. at 521.
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nation for this reluctance is that people associate criminal be-
havior with other undesirable characteristics,88 such as low
productivity.89 Regardless of the reasons for attaching social
stigma to criminals, the effect is clear: by imposing social detri-
ments on criminals (e.g., difficulty getting a job), stigma serves
as an efficient punishment.90 Even when a person’s surrounding
community does not know of her criminal record, she can still
experience self-imposed alienation out of fear that others will
discover her identity.91 Some commentators point out that soci-
ety may still impose guilt for a crime on the accused even after
the accused has been proven innocent.92
The wrongful conviction of Michael Toney illustrates how
much of an effect society’s perception of a person’s guilt can
have on that person’s life. Despite the fact that Toney was exon-
erated from a bombing conviction after spending ten years on
death row,93 Toney was unable to escape harassment from law
enforcement,94 unsubstantiated insinuations by the state that
Toney was guilty,95 and public statements of his guilt by the vic-
tim’s family.96 Even exoneration in a court of law could not save
Toney from going to his grave bearing the accusations of guilt of
a heinous crime.97
Toney’s case provides a more extreme example of the possi-
ble effects, but the underlying stigma and its effects are still
widely prevalent.98 For example, the stigma of a drunk-driving
88 Id.
89 Id. at 522–23.
90 Id. at 536–37.
91 See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions
in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2197–98 (2003).
92 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Vartkessian & Jared P. Tyler, Legal and Social Exonera-
tion: The Consequences of Michael Toney’s Wrongful Conviction, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1467,
1468 (2012) (noting that, in some circumstances, the public may still question
the innocence of an exonerated person).
93 Id. at 1482–83.
94 Id. at 1487.
95 Id. “[T]he state . . . framed [Toney’s] release in terms of a legal technicality
and spoke of the need for more time to investigate rather than the fact that, after
a review of the evidence, there was no credible evidence that Mr. Toney had
committed the bombing.” Id. at 1482–83.
96 Id. at 1486.
97 See id.
98 42 MICHAEL E. REID & GARY W. LOVE, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES: MISSOURI
DUI HANDBOOK, at intro. (2017 ed.), Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017)
(noting manifold collateral consequences of a drunk-driving conviction, such as
an increase in car insurance premiums, suspension or expulsion from higher ed-
ucation, termination or suspension from employment, loss of a professional li-
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conviction significantly affects one’s employability. A person
seeking employment encounters numerous obstacles once she
receives even one conviction.99 These take many forms, such as
restrictions on granting occupational licenses to convicted
criminals and required mandatory criminal background
checks.100 Regardless of the form, the effects of a person’s crimi-
nal record are clear: that person is barred from the opportunity
of obtaining any meaningful employment.101 Inability to gain
meaningful employment is detrimental to the convicted’s family
and the community at large.102
In sum, prosecuting one crime impacts far more people than
merely the accused. The judiciary must expend resources hear-
ing the case. The government must expend resources on the
accused’s incarceration. The accused’s family must bear the loss
of her contributions to the family. And, the accused’s criminal
record could plague her and her family for the rest of her life.
Additionally, pilots bear unique costs when they acquire a
criminal record. One such cost is that these pilots will not be
granted security clearance to enter certain secure areas.103 Al-
though obtaining employment with a criminal record is already
difficult for the general population, pilots seeking commercial
airline jobs face additional difficulties due to the competitive
pool of candidates.104 This disadvantage is compounded by the
fact that airlines may not want to hire a pilot who may be barred
from entering some countries due to her criminal record.105
Some even warn that convictions such as driving under the influ-
cense, increased difficulty in leaving the country, and loss of child custody
rights).
99 See Pinard, supra note 78, at 492.
100 Id. at 492–93.
101 Id. at 493–94.
102 Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 77, at 153 (noting that the “less direct but
still highly consequential costs of imprisonment, includ[e] the diversion and di-
rection of funds for prisons away from schools and from minority communities,
the damaging effects of imprisonment on employment prospects, and the detri-
mental impact of imprisoning parents on their children.”).
103 See Pilot Careers: Can You Fly with a Criminal Record?, ALLCLEARED (Jan. 10,
2018), https://allcleared.com/blog/pilot-careers-can-fly-criminal-record/
[https://perma.cc/G4P7-63GE] (noting that Canada and the United States both
may limit pilot access to certain areas based on their criminal records).
104 See id.
105 See id. (noting that a driving under the influence conviction will bar en-
trance into Canada).
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ence (DUI) can be a “job killer.”106 Since airlines are very wary
of pilots that have DUI convictions,107 they are certainly likely to
use extreme caution when considering applicants with convic-
tions for drunk flying.
In light of the massive collateral consequences associated with
a pilot’s criminal record, broadening the scope of “operate” in
the context of airplane crimes is, at best, an inefficient means of
dealing with pilot misconduct and ensuring passenger safety.
Even without such costs, common sense teaches that not all cog-
nitively impaired pilots will be prevented from leaving the run-
way with passengers since, under the current system,
breathalyzer tests are only administered if there is reason to be-
lieve that the pilot is impaired.108 A flight crew that is busy with
preflight checks may not notice a drunk pilot before they take
flight. Moreover, researchers that have studied the relationship
between criminal punishment and crime rates have noted that
recidivism rates post-incarceration do not conclusively show a
decline in criminal activity as a result of imprisonment.109 Thus,
the current system of preventing drunk flying is far from the
best.
Pointing out these flaws, however, does not deal with the un-
comfortable reality that preflight activities can make or break a
flight. As explained below, the demand on pilots to be attentive
to every detail long before passengers board the plane may ac-
count for the judiciary’s willingness to stretch the meaning of
“operate” as far as it can reach.
106 6 Student Pilot Mistakes that Can Ruin a Career, UPPER LIMIT AVIATION (Aug.
14, 2015), https://upperlimitaviation.edu/student-pilot-mistakes-that-can-ruin-
career/ [https://perma.cc/A9GQ-N3EH].
107 Id. (“Prospective employers are very concerned about driving records”); see
also Pilot Careers: Can You Fly with a Criminal Record?, supra note 103 (“Some types
of records, such as drug trafficking, DUI and dangerous driving may be consid-
ered particularly relevant to [an] application.”).
108 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(c)–(d) (2006).
109 See, e.g., Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 77, at 138; Daniel S. Nagin et al.,
Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 178 (2009) (“a key finding of
our review is that the great majority of studies point to a null . . . effect of the
prison experience on subsequent offending.”).
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V. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATING PILOTS’
PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. THE FLIGHT PROCESS
Many passengers do not realize that a “pilot’s working day
does not begin and does not end with his performance in the
cockpit.”110 The preflight checklist tends to be the longest
checklist for the flight crew, having at times thirty or more
steps.111 The pilot in command has the final word on whether
the aircraft is ready for flight even before getting into the cock-
pit.112 The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) calls
flight preparation “the most important, yet most underap-
preciated part of any flight.”113 After all, preflight inspection is
the one time for pilots to verify that all equipment is working
properly before having an in-flight emergency.114 The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has found that many air-
craft fatalities could be prevented by reasonable preflight in-
spection,115 including inspection of areas not typically associated
with causing improper landing.116 The average flyer likely does
110 A Pilot’s Shift Starts Long Before the Cockpit, PILOT CAREER NEWS (Apr. 13,
2012), https://www.pilotcareernews.com/a-pilot%E2%80%99s-shift-starts-long-
before-the-cockpit/ [https://perma.cc/2HE5-4RSC].
111 Flight Safety, Discipline and Importance of Checklists, BAA TRAINING (Sept. 25,
2017), http://www.baatraining.com/flight-safety-discipline-and-importance-of-
checklists/ [https://perma.cc/2ZLA-DUZA].
112 Id. (“It is stressed that the Pilot in Command is 100% responsible for verify-
ing that the aircraft is perfectly safe to fly before even getting into the cockpit.”).
113 Dale Smith, Preflight Precision: Turn a Cursory Once-Over of the Airplane into a
Proactive Safety Tool, FLIGHT TRAINING MAG. (Nov. 5, 2004), https://www.aopa
.org/news-and-media/all-news/2004/november/flight-training-magazine/pre
flight-precision [https://perma.cc/YAV7-235P] (Flight Training Magazine is a pub-
lication of the AOPA).
114 Id.
115 Peter Garrison, Inadequate Preflight: The NTSB Often Cites Hasty or Neglected
Preflight Inspections as an Accident Cause, but Is There More to the Story?, FLYING MAG.
(Dec. 1, 2003), https://www.flyingmag.com/safety/accident-investigations/inad
equate-preflight [https://perma.cc/6YMN-8Y4W]. From the years 1993–2003,
“the National Transportation Safety Board . . . used the phrase ‘inadequate pre-
flight inspection’ in the probable causes of 15 fatal accidents.” Id.
116 Id. (“Other oversights include improperly latched baggage doors; various
kinds of protective gear left in place, like pitot covers, control locks and foam air-
intake plugs; oil filler or fuel tank caps unsecured; or failure to remove a board-
ing ladder or a chock. . . . Noteworthy about these causes is the fact that most of
them—most especially unlatched baggage doors—should not have prevented the
airplane from landing safely; but some pilots, rattled by the unfamiliar, lose con-
trol of perfectly flyable airplanes while returning to land.”).
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not fully appreciate the amount of time pilots must invest in a
single, short flight.
Due to the large number of airplane parts that must be
checked on the ground,117 most pilots, regardless of the length
of the flight, must arrive at the airport two hours before depar-
ture.118 Just like passengers, pilots must undergo security checks
to enter the airport.119 Every flight crew must undertake four
essential steps to properly prepare for a flight: “medical check,
flight data analysis, briefing and aircraft check.”120
The medical check is typically just a general examination and
blood pressure check; however, a pilot may have to undergo ad-
ditional tests, such as a blood test, if medical personnel are con-
cerned about the condition of the pilot.121 Once medical
personnel confirm that the pilot and flight crew are mentally
and physically fit for flight, the crew undertakes the flight exami-
nation and analysis of flight data.122 Flight data includes infor-
mation such as the weather forecast, a map of the flight route,
and a landing chart.123 The pilot and the first officer use this
data to calculate the necessary amount of fuel.124 After briefing
the first officer and other personnel, the captain checks the ex-
ternal and internal aircraft systems.125 This includes personally
checking the engines, tail planes, and exterior for any deformi-
ties (e.g., ice formations), all while the airplane is being fu-
eled.126 The exterior walk-around check is usually performed by
only one pilot.127
Four of the most critical mechanical areas that must be
checked to ensure flight safety are the “control surfaces, landing
gear, engine, and the runup.”128 For control surfaces, there is
117 See, e.g., Functional Check Flight Compendium, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUND. 24–31
(2016) https://flightsafety.org/files/FCF_Compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P7V4-JKSU] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
118 See A Pilot’s Shift Starts Long Before the Cockpit, supra note 110.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 John Cox, Ask the Captain: Standard Procedure for Starting a Flight, USA TODAY
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/columnist/cox/2018/
08/19/standard-pilot-procedure-starting-flight/1009100002/ [https://perma
.cc/WZR6-KYA2] (“One pilot then goes outside to visually inspect the airplane.”).
128 Smith, supra note 113.
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more to check than simply “does it move?”129 Many flight acci-
dents are caused by crossed controls (e.g., the control moves in
the wrong direction), and scraping sounds during movement
can be a sign of mechanical damage.130 However, some surfaces,
such as the tail’s vertical stabilizer and the antennae, should not
move.131
While checking the landing gear, the pilot is mainly perform-
ing a visual inspection for cracks or deformities, as well as ensur-
ing that the plane sits level.132 The engine check is the most
difficult, but perhaps the most critical, part of the pilot’s pref-
light procedure.133 The pilot must verify that there are no oil
leaks, loose connectors, or other visibly damaged parts.134 Fur-
ther, listening to the engine once it is running can help the pilot
identify “fouled plugs, exhaust leaks, a collapsed flame tube,
[or] a stuck valve . . . .”135 Although not every engine will fail
outright, resulting in violent shaking and oil on the windshield
as the plane loses altitude, if there is an issue, partial power loss
from an engine defect could still result in altitude loss.136 Once
the pilot has landed, it is good practice to reinspect the airplane
for the next flight.137
Engine failure is not the only risk that preflight procedures
can prevent. In certain situations (e.g., in bad weather condi-
tions or at night), a vacuum pump failure or electrical failure
can turn into a dire in-flight emergency.138 Pilots also must be
wary of control failures, although they are unlikely.139 Lack of
adequate preparation can also result in landing gear failure and
129 See id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See id.; see also Emergency Procedures, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N,
https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/online-learning/safety-advisors-and-
safety-briefs/emergency-procedures [https://perma.cc/Z2Y7-JPX6] (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019) (“[M]ost engine failures don’t just ‘happen.’ There’s a good
chance that the engine has been giving hints about its poor health in the hours
leading up to the failure. Abrupt changes in oil consumption, unusual engine
monitor indications, failure to develop proper static rpm, or unusual noises or
vibrations are all worth investigating.”).
134 See Smith, supra note 113.
135 Id.
136 Emergency Procedures, supra note 133.
137 See Smith, supra note 113 (“Tying down the airplane after a flight is a good
time to begin the next preflight.”).
138 See Emergency Procedures, supra note 133.
139 Id.
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weather-related difficulties, but these are typically less risky
problems than engine, electrical, or vacuum pump failure.140
Accident reports from the AOPA illustrate the importance of
preflight procedures. For example, in 2001, engine failure
caused a pilot attempting to depart from the Santa Monica Mu-
nicipal airport to re-land on the runway.141 The pilot did not
have sufficient runway to come to a complete stop, so the air-
plane ran “off the end of the runway, vaulted an embankment,”
and then landed in a fiery and fatal crash.142 The NTSB deter-
mined that the pilot would not have experienced engine failure
if he had removed the control gust lock prior to takeoff.143 Al-
though the pilot’s failure to abort the flight sooner also contrib-
uted to the tragic accident,144 a more thorough preflight check
would have allowed him to remove the control gust lock and
prevent the emergency.
Similarly, in 2017, a Melbourne pilot’s plane failed to ascend
properly, resulting in its crashing into a shopping center within
ten seconds of takeoff.145 The cause of the accident was the pi-
lot’s failure to ensure that the plane’s rudder trim tab was not in
a neutral position.146 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau
concluded that the pilot had five chances before flight to check
the rudder trim tab, but he missed the error because he did not
follow his preflight checklist.147 The deaths of the pilot and his
four passengers could have been avoided if he had performed a
simple visual check of the rudder trim.
B. METHODS OF PILOT REGULATION
Clearly, due to the relative ease with which fatal failures can
be prevented, the legislature has a reasonable motive for regu-
140 See id.
141 Preflight Check Complete?, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N, https://www
.aopa.org/training-and-safety/air-safety-institute/accident-analysis/featured-acci
dents/epilot-asf-accident-reports-preflight-check-complete [https://perma.cc/
2BP5-RY8U] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. (“The NTSB determined the cause of this accident to be the pilot’s fail-
ure to remove the control gust lock prior to takeoff and his failure to abort the
takeoff with sufficient runway remaining to safely stop.”).
145 Essendon DFO Plane Crash Pilot Failed to Complete Checklist, GUARDIAN (Sept.
23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/essendon-dfo-
plane-crash-pilot-failed-to-complete-checklist [https://perma.cc/7T53-2CW3].
146 Id.
147 Id.
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lating who is certified to be a pilot and for imposing criminal
and civil penalties for failure to follow procedures and other
dangerous activities. Like many other professions, pilots must
meet periodic certification requirements to maintain their sta-
tuses as pilots. With the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act,
every U.S. pilot must be examined and certified by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA).148 The FAA has the authority to
modify, revoke, or suspend a pilot’s certificate upon reexamina-
tion of the pilot’s fitness and qualifications.149
In addition to certifying who can become a pilot, govern-
ments at all levels have extensively regulated pilot consumption
of alcohol. Federal restrictions regarding alcohol can chiefly be
found in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and some
penalties from the Federal Aviation Act appear in provisions of
United States Code.150 On top of these federal laws, state laws
and commercial airline policies also regulate the use of alcohol
by pilots—sometimes even more stringently than federal regula-
tions.151 For example, 14 C.F.R. § 91.17 bars pilots from drink-
ing within eight hours before a flight.152 Most major airlines,
finding this rule too lenient, extend the “bottle-to-throttle” re-
striction period to up to twenty-four hours.153 The myriad of
rules control not only the “amount of time between drinking
and flying” but also “the permissible BAC at the time of flight,
the prerequisites for medical certification, and the availability of
non-flight related evidence of alcohol problems.”154 Pilots also
must disclose whether they have any DUIs in their annual and
semiannual medical evaluations.155 Interestingly, despite the ex-
tent of regulations on pilots generally, and especially in relation
to alcohol consumption, there is no federal law mandating alco-
hol testing of pilots without evidence of impairment.156
148 Jamey Holmes, Comment, Is the Federal Aviation Administration “Kicking the
Dog?”: Pilot Disciplinary Proceedings and the Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57 J. AIR L. &
COM. 297, 297 (1991).
149 Id. Such a punishment can even be upheld when the only evidence is the
pilot’s own testimony.
150 Denise Urzendowski Scofield, Comment, Knowing When to Say When: Federal
Regulation of Alcohol Consumption by Air Pilots, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 937, 948 (1992).
151 Id.
152 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a)(1) (2006).
153 Scofield, supra note 150, at 949–50.
154 Id. at 949.
155 Id. at 961.
156 Id. at 968.
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This is clearly a major oversight for Congress’s attempt to en-
sure flight safety. Due to the failure of the legislature and the
flight industry to mandate BAC tests to prevent drunk pilots
from ever having the opportunity to get near an airplane, fed-
eral courts have decided to pick up the slack by adopting broad
definitions of “operating.” These broad definitions not only
seem to defy the common, intuitive definition of “operate,” but
they also: (1) forego clear, textual evidence to interpret “oper-
ate” more narrowly; and (2) overcriminalize pilots by imposing
the stigma of a drunk flying charge before they ever endanger
any airplane passengers.
VI. A NEW PROPOSAL: MANDATORY BAC TESTING
BEFORE ENTERING THE COCKPIT
A more logical approach to ensure that pilots and other air-
plane personnel are not impaired by alcohol is to require
mandatory BAC testing when crew members arrive for their
shift.157 This approach—the impossibility approach—is justified
by: (1) the effectiveness of mandatory BAC testing on recidivist
drunk drivers; and (2) the drastic collateral consequences that
could result from an unnecessary conviction.
A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY BAC TESTING
In recent years, several states have enacted laws allowing (or
sometimes requiring) judges to mandate installation of alcohol
ignition interlocks in the cars of drunk drivers.158 Requiring in-
stallation of an interlock is usually a condition of restoring the
driving privileges of a convicted drunk driver.159 Such a punish-
ment attaches in most states only after multiple DUI offenses,160
although some state legislatures have proposed statutes mandat-
ing use of alcohol ignition interlocks after a single drunk-driving
conviction.161
157 This Comment speaks in terms of subjecting pilots specifically to BAC test-
ing upon arriving for a shift, but the same policy concerns apply with equal force
to requiring BAC tests of all flight personnel.
158 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Ignition
Interlock Laws, 15 A.L.R.6th 375 (2006).
159 Gregory T. Neugebauer, Alcohol Ignition Interlocks: Magic Bullet or Poison Pill?,
2 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2002) (“Today, over forty states . . . can require
drivers convicted of multiple DUI offenses to install an ignition interlock device
as a condition for restoration of driving privileges.”).
160 See id.
161 See Andrew Sullivan, Comment, Ending Drunk Driving with a Flash of Light, 21
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 16 (2015); see also Joseph Marutollo, Comment, No Second
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Alcohol ignition interlocks require the driver to blow air into
it in order to start the car.162 The device prevents starting the car
if the driver’s BAC is over a certain limit.163 Since a drunk driver
could easily cheat the device by having a sober friend breathe
into the interlock, most of the devices require periodic “running
retests.”164 Failing a running retest may cause the car to honk
and its lights to flash in an effort to alert law enforcement.165
Abundant data show how effective alcohol ignition interlocks
are in reducing drunk-driving arrests, particularly in recidivists.
Alcohol ignition interlocks can reduce DUI re-arrests by up to
67%.166 Within one year of adopting a law requiring ignition in-
terlocks for first-time drunk-driving offenders, New Mexico pre-
vented 63,000 drunk-driving events within its borders and
reduced alcohol-related fatalities by 25%.167
Regarding recidivism, the International Council on Alcohol,
Drugs and Traffic Safety has found that “[i]n the aggregate, evi-
dence spanning nearly ten years by [eight] or more research
groups in the United States and Canada point toward 40%–95%
reductions in recidivism while the interlock programs are in ef-
fect . . . .”168 States that have studied recidivism rates among
drunk drivers who are required to install ignition interlocks
(versus rates among drunk drivers who are not) have found that
ignition interlocks drastically reduce drunk-driving arrests.169
Despite ample evidence showing the effectiveness of alcohol
ignition interlocks in reducing drunk driving, they are un-
derutilized170 and subject to critical debate. Critics assert objec-
Chances: Leandra’s Law and Mandatory Alcohol Ignition Interlocks for First-Time Drunk
Driving Offenders, 30 PACE L. REV. 1090, 1090, 1098 (2010) (noting the proposal of
New York’s “Leandra’s Law” and the adoption of New Mexico’s law concerning
first-time offenders).
162 Marutollo, supra note 161, at 1091.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 1092.
165 Id.
166 Sullivan, supra note 161, at 7.
167 Marutollo, supra note 161, at 1099.
168 Id. at 1097 (alteration in original); see also Zitter, supra note 158, § 2.
169 E.g., Marutollo, supra note 161, at 1097–98 (In Maryland, “researchers
‘found statistically significant reductions in recidivism by multiple offenders who
installed interlock devices in [their] vehicles.’ An Ohio study found even more
impressive results: ‘recidivism rates were three times higher for offenders who
received a license suspension compared with offenders placed in an interlock
group.’”) (alteration in original).
170 Sullivan, supra note 161, at 8 (“[B]oth preventative and remedial measures
to reduce drunk driving are grossly underutilized. In the case of breathalyzer-
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tions against interlock programs primarily based on
constitutional grounds, such as equal protection and separation
of powers.171 Others maintain that alcohol ignition interlocks
are just a Band-Aid solution that does not address the “root” of
the drunk-driving problem: “hardcore alcohol abusers.”172 How-
ever, constitutional challenges against interlock statutes are typi-
cally not successful in court,173 and even if the use of interlocks
does not address the root of the drunk-driving problem, it still
successfully reduces the rate of drunk driving.
Drunk-driving laws are very similar in function to pilot alcohol
laws: they both protect public safety. Public safety is clearly en-
hanced by making particular criminal conduct impossible (i.e.,
preventing drunk driving through alcohol ignition interlocks);
therefore, a similar type of mandatory BAC testing would better
serve public safety than overcriminalization through broad statu-
tory construction. Moreover, overcriminalization of flying has
the potential to increase burdens on the accused, the court, and
society generally.
B. INSTITUTING AN IMPOSSIBILITY APPROACH: MANDATORY
PREFLIGHT BAC TESTING
A federal statute that requires pilots to take a BAC test prior
to flying would be a more efficient and more effective method
than the current penal approach. Not only would this method
prevent the collateral consequences of convicting a pilot of
drunk flying, but it would also be more effective at preventing
pilots from flying while intoxicated by making it impossible to
commit the crime.
Proponents of mandatory BAC testing of drivers with DUIs
through ignition interlock devices have emphasized that
preventing drunk driving saves thousands of lives and billions of
dollars.174 By preventing a crime from happening, society avoids
the costs of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing the crimi-
based [ignition interlock devices (IIDs)] only 20% of eligible offenders were ac-
tually enrolled in a program requiring their installation.”) (footnotes omitted).
171 See Neugebauer, supra note 159.
172 Marutollo, supra note 161, at 1094.
173 See Neugebauer, supra note 159 (“A constitutional challenge to an interlock
statute faces a steep uphill battle because having a driver’s license is not a funda-
mental right and because of the judicial deference generally accorded public wel-
fare and social legislation.”).
174 Id. (“Alcohol-related, fatal traffic accidents cost Americans a staggering $50
billion annually in medical expenses, property damage, lost productivity, and
other expenses. If a universal interlock program targeted only legally intoxicated
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nal conduct, and the perpetrator of the crime avoids the collat-
eral consequences resulting from her conviction.175 Ignition
interlock devices have the power to address every incident of
drunk driving that criminal proceedings cannot practically ad-
dress.176 In light of the manifold benefits of making drunk driv-
ing impossible following a DUI conviction, some have even
argued for a federal regulation requiring all cars to have inter-
lock type devices, regardless of the driver’s criminal record.177
Despite these benefits, some commentators have reservations
about this approach due to privacy concerns and the possible
negative consequences of circumventing judicial oversight of
criminal conduct. In regard to privacy, the worry is that inter-
lock devices in cars could store information on the driver’s BAC
level.178 Even if the driver’s BAC is well under the legal limit,
plaintiff’s attorneys could still use this information in claims for
negligent driving.179 The fear seems to be that the general pub-
lic’s risk of liability for otherwise legal driving would skyrocket.
Another concern is that making certain crimes impossible robs
the public of its chance to comment on or challenge the fairness
of the law.180
These concerns, however, are not relevant to the present pro-
posal for the federal government to mandate that airlines per-
form BAC tests on pilots prior to preflight checks—Airlines
could use BAC testing devices that do not store user data. While
judicial discussion of the law may be stifled by making the crime
impossible, the safety benefits of the proposed requirement far
outweigh this loss. Moreover, asserting a strong federal rule re-
quiring pilots to take a BAC test before every flight would affect
the judicially recognized policy goals detailed in cases support-
ing federal preemption over aviation law. These goals include
drivers, up to 12,000 lives and $40 billion could be saved annually.”) (footnotes
omitted).
175 Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 795, 805 (2013).
176 Sullivan, supra note 161, at 74 (“Criminal proceedings cannot reasonably
reach every one of the over 112 million annual incidences of drunk driving—but
mandating the installation of IIDs . . . could prevent each of those incidences
from ever occurring.”).
177 Id. at 2.
178 See Neugebauer, supra note 159 (noting that an interlock could be record-
ing “every sip”).
179 See id.
180 See Rich, supra note 175, at 828.
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upholding legislative intent to preempt airspace regulation, in-
creasing passenger safety, and avoiding excessive airline liability.
C. PREEMPTION: THE FAA AND POLICY SUPPORT
FOR CENTRALIZATION
It is well established that “no aircraft or pilot can ever outfly
the reach of Washington.”181 Justice Jackson recognized Con-
gress’s broad authority to regulate the National Airspace System
in a famous concurrence, stating that:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander
about the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal per-
mission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally
certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal com-
mands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in
an elaborate and detailed system of controls.182
Indeed, there are many compelling arguments justifying
strong central control. For example, airplane manufacturers
would only have to meet one set of federal safety standards with-
out fear that a state jury might find a design defect.183 Greater
certainty with respect to design standards may also give custom-
ers the benefit of technological advances used to meet those
standards.184 Moreover, it seems more logical to allow Congress,
with its ability to consult scientists, engineers, and test pilots, to
determine the standards of air safety rather than letting lay ju-
rors decide what security measures airlines should be legally re-
quired to meet.185 Similarly, it would be unreasonable to subject
airline personnel to different standards of care as they cross sev-
eral state lines in a single journey.186
These policy concerns are bolstered by the argument that
Congress’s intent to be the last word on aviation regulation is
evidenced by its comprehensive regulations to “preempt the
field,” and its desire to ensure not only passenger safety but also
181 E.g., Sean S. Kelly, Comment, Federalism in Flight: Preemption Doctrine and Air
Crash Litigation, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 107, 114 (2000).
182 Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
183 See, e.g., Patrick J. Shea, Note, Solving America’s General Aviation Crisis: The
Advantages of Federal Preemption over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 798
(1995).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 181, at 121.
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the health of the aviation industry.187 Thus, even though federal
regulations may, at times, leave plaintiffs wanting, they are the
legislature’s best effort at striking an optimal balance that not
only safeguards customers but also promotes the health of the
airline industry, a factor that juries deciding state tort claims are
not expected to consider.188
Much of the preemption debate in aviation law centers
around how tort actions are affected by enactment of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act189 and its subsequent amendments190—the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)191 and the General
Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA).192 When it comes to judi-
cially created implied preemption, all federal circuits agree that
the field of air safety is preempted; however, circuits are split on
just how far preemption reaches.193 Specifically, courts vary on
what types of claims the federal standard of care articulated in
14 C.F.R. § 91.13194 should apply to. Courts apply either implied
preemption through the Federal Aviation Act, or express pre-
emption through the ADA.
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act to centralize au-
thority over airspace regulations in one entity: the FAA Adminis-
trator.195 The law states explicitly that “[a] remedy under this
part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.”196
GARA, which sets an eighteen-year time limit on claims “for
death or injury, or damage to property, relating to general avia-
187 Id. at 120.
188 See id.
189 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
190 See Edward Boula, Brief, Taking Flight or Landing: Implied Field Preemption
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and Wyeth v. Levine, 24 DCBA BRIEF 34, 35
(2012).
191 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
192 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552.
193 Boula, supra note 192, at 34.
194 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2019) ((a) “No person may operate an aircraft in a care-
less or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another”; and
(b) “No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the purpose of air naviga-
tion, on any part of the surface of an airport used by aircraft for air commerce
(including areas used by those aircraft for receiving or discharging persons or
cargo), in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.”).
195 Michael J. Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Preemption in the
Field of Air, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 12 (2011).
196 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2016) (originally enacted as Federal Aviation Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 798).
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tion aircraft and their component parts,”197 contains a similar
savings clause.198 In contrast, the ADA explicitly preempts the
states from enacting any law, standard, rule, or regulation re-
lated to prices, routes, and services of any carrier.199
While the trend less than ten years ago was toward increasing
deference to federal law,200 courts in recent years have favored
state law by finding no federal preemption for certain types of
tort claims.201 Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,202 the leading
case on federal preemption of aviation law,203 illustrates the
courts’ ambivalence to the preemption debate. The issue in this
case was the appropriate standard of care for American’s airline
personnel in tort suits brought by passengers injured by severe
weather turbulence.204 The Third Circuit found that a federal
standard of care preempted the state standard of care, but that
state damage remedies still existed for breach of the federal
standard of care.205
Although Abdullah has since been narrowed by the Third Cir-
cuit in Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corporation so that state law
products liability claims are not preempted by federal law unless
they conflict with the FAA’s certification for aircraft design,206
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have embraced the Abdullah hold-
ing.207 The Fifth Circuit held in Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. that
197 Timothy S. McAllister, Comment, A “Tail” of Liability Reform: General Avia-
tion Revitalization Act of 1994 & the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23
TRANSP. L.J. 301, 310–11 (1995).
198 Holland, supra note 195, at 13.
199 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012) (originally enacted as General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552).
200 Holland, supra note 195, at 11 (“Federal courts and, to a lesser degree, the
state courts have shown an increasing deference to federal law in determining
whether federal rather than state law governs issues of aviation safety . . . .”).
201 James Dick & Graham Keithley, Recent Federal Preemption Developments in the
Aviation Industry, 30 AIR & SPACE LAW. 4, 4 (2017) (“Courts appear to increasingly
disregard the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) views or congressional
intent to find state law claims viable absent clear express or conflict
preemption.”).
202 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
203 Holland, supra note 195, at 16.
204 Id. at 17.
205 Id.
206 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 708–09 (3d Cir. 2016)
(holding that “[t]he field of aviation safety . . . identified as preempted in Abdul-
lah does not include product manufacture and design, which continues to be
governed by state tort law, subject to traditional conflict preemption
principles.”).
207 See Holland, supra note 195, at 21–22.
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the Federal Aviation Act’s preemptive reach is broad enough to
reach claims for failure to warn based on anything other than a
federal standard of care.208 The Ninth Circuit in Montalvo v.
Spirit Airlines examined the historical circumstances that led to
the enactment of the Act, its legislative history, and the language
used in it to conclude that “Congress intended to invest the Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration with the au-
thority to enact exclusive air safety standards.”209 The court
inferred the Administrator’s preemptive intent to “displace all
state law on the subject of air safety” from its enactment of “per-
vasive regulations.”210
One principle seems to be clear from the preemption debate:
courts seek to centralize control of airspace, but they are also
hesitant to leave plaintiffs wanting for a remedy. Allowing the
federal standard of care to predominate while also refusing to
find preemption of some state law tort claims seems to be an
effort to allow plaintiffs’ remedies wherever possible, balancing
this with protecting the airline industry from crushing liability.
Mandating BAC tests for pilots upon arriving for a shift would
eliminate the need for this judicial struggle. Airlines could
merely send pilots with high BAC levels home, making it impos-
sible for them to commit flight-related criminal or tortious activ-
ity while drunk. Passengers receive more protection this way,
and they do not have to relinquish any other potential state tort
claims. Airlines also will not face any liability from drunken pilot
conduct. While the procedure for enacting legislation requiring
pilots to take BAC tests upon arriving for each shift is outside
the scope of this Comment, such a law clearly supports the legis-
lature’s interests in centralizing airspace control, limiting airline
liability, and increasing passenger safety.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts that have examined statutes that prohibit “operating”
an airplane under reckless circumstances (e.g., while drunk)
have strongly emphasized the federal government’s interest in
air safety. The federal government could best pursue this safety
interest through a uniform mandate requiring BAC testing of
pilots prior to preflight checks. This approach is both more effi-
cient and more effective than criminalizing a broad range of pi-
208 See Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2004).
209 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2007).
210 Id.
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lot conduct. The focus should be on preventing dangerous
conduct and the collateral consequences of a criminal convic-
tion, rather than making it easier for courts to slap pilots with a
criminal record before any lives are put in danger.
